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# vault1984
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> *"If you want to keep a secret, you must also hide it from yourself."*
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A password manager where the server holds your vault and nothing else.
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Every other hosted vault encrypts your secrets and stores them centrally. The encryption is real. The problem is architectural: steal the database, and you have all the ciphertext you need — plus unlimited time to crack it offline. Iteration counts slow the attack. They don't prevent it.
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vault1984 is built around a different principle. **The server holds ciphertext it cannot decrypt.** Not policy. Architecture.
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---
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## How it works
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Three tiers. Each with a different trust model.
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```
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Tier 1 — Metadata (server-readable)
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Entry names, URLs, usernames. The server can see these.
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Knowing someone has a Coinbase account isn't an attack.
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Tier 2 — Credentials (agent-readable, server-opaque)
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Passwords, API keys, TOTP seeds, SSH keys.
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Encrypted with a key derived from your hardware authenticator.
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The server stores ciphertext it cannot read.
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Your AI agents decrypt locally. The server never sees plaintext.
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Tier 3 — Sealed (hardware-only)
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Card numbers, passport, government IDs, seed phrases.
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Encrypted with a symmetric key derived from WebAuthn PRF.
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Requires physical authenticator — Touch ID, YubiKey, Titan Key.
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Even a fully authorized AI agent cannot reach Tier 3.
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```
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Steal the database. You get Tier 1 metadata and encrypted blobs for Tier 2 and 3 that require hardware the server never had. The database is not interesting.
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---
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## The security model
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| Scenario | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Database stolen | Metadata only | Worthless ciphertext | Worthless ciphertext |
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| Server compromised | Plaintext (during request) | Ciphertext — server cannot decrypt | Not present |
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| Agent compromised | Via MCP | Decryptable by that agent | Not present |
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| Hardware key stolen + PIN | Everything | Everything | Everything |
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**Tier 2 key derivation:** X25519 keypair derived via HKDF-SHA256 from your WebAuthn authenticator's PRF output. Public key stored on server. Private key: derived client-side during browser session, baked into agent tokens at creation time. Server holds envelopes it cannot open.
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**Tier 3 key derivation:** Symmetric AES-256 key derived via HKDF-SHA256 from the same PRF output (independent branch). Browser-only. Never leaves the client.
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Both tiers derive from a single hardware authentication. One tap in the browser unlocks both.
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---
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## Quick start
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```bash
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go build -o vault1984 ./cmd/vault1984/
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./vault1984
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# Open http://localhost:1984/app/
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# Register a passkey → vault is ready
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```
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No config files, no environment variables, no database setup.
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---
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## Managed hosting
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Don't want to run the server? We host it.
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Same cryptographic guarantees. We run the infrastructure. We cannot read your Tier 2 or Tier 3 fields — the architecture makes it impossible, not policy.
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→ vault1984.com
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---
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## Features
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- **One binary** — Go, linux/mac/windows. FIPS mode available (`GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto`)
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- **One file** — SQLite per vault. Portable, copy it anywhere
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- **No master password** — WebAuthn only. Touch ID, Face ID, YubiKey, Titan Key, Windows Hello
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- **Three-tier field encryption** — per-field tier assignment, auto-detection on import
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- **AI agent integration** — MCP tools for `get_credential`, `get_totp`, `search_vault`, `list_credentials`, `check_expiring`
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- **Scoped tokens** — per-agent access by tags or entry IDs. Cryptographic scoping, not policy
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- **Auto-detection** — imports auto-flag card numbers, CVV, government IDs, recovery codes as Tier 3 across 15+ languages
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- **Auto-lock** — 60s idle + 15s countdown. Session and key cleared on lock
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- **TOTP generation** — agents can complete 2FA flows autonomously
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- **Browser extension** — Manifest V3, LLM field mapping, autofill on any site
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- **Native import** — Chrome, Firefox, Bitwarden, Proton Pass without LLM. Any format via LLM fallback
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- **Smart dedup** — collision resolution by source modification date
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- **Automatic backups** — weekly, 3-month retention, deterministic per vault ID
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- **Audit log** — every access logged with actor (web / extension / MCP / agent name)
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- **Multi-tenant** — hosted mode with `/v/{vault_id}/` route prefix
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---
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## MCP setup
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Create a token in the web UI (Tokens page):
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```json
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"vault1984": {
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"url": "http://localhost:1984/mcp",
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"headers": {
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"Authorization": "Bearer v1984_..."
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}
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}
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}
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}
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```
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The token contains both the MCP auth credential and the Tier 2 private key (wrapped). The agent decrypts Tier 2 fields locally. The server never sees the key.
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### Available tools
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| Tool | Description |
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|------|-------------|
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| `get_credential` | Find and return a credential by query |
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| `list_credentials` | List all accessible entries |
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| `get_totp` | Get live TOTP code for 2FA |
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| `search_vault` | Full-text search across entries |
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| `check_expiring` | Find expiring credentials, cards, documents |
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Tier 3 fields return `[Sealed — hardware key required]` to agents. They are not accessible without a browser session and physical authenticator.
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---
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## Config
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All optional. Environment variables or `.env` in working directory.
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```bash
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PORT=1984 # default
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DATA_DIR=. # directory for vault DB files
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MODE=self-hosted # or "hosted" for multi-tenant
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VAULT_KEY=... # optional server-side encryption key for Tier 1
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FIREWORKS_API_KEY=... # for LLM import of unknown formats
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```
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---
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## Import
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Native parsing (no LLM) for:
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- **Chrome** — `chrome://settings/passwords` → export CSV
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- **Firefox** — `about:logins` → export CSV
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- **Bitwarden** — Settings → Export → JSON
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- **Proton Pass** — Settings → Export → JSON (zip or plain)
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Any other format: drag and drop, LLM parses it.
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Tier 3 auto-detection on import covers card numbers, CVV, government IDs (SSN, passport, driver's license, BSN, PESEL, etc.), recovery codes, and crypto wallets — in English, Dutch, German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Arabic, Hindi, Turkish, Polish, Swedish, Thai, and Vietnamese.
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---
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## Backups
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Automatic weekly backups with 3-month retention. Each vault's backup slot is deterministic — the first byte of the vault ID maps to an hour of the week, spreading backup load evenly across nodes.
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Backups use SQLite `VACUUM INTO` for consistent snapshots stored in `{DATA_DIR}/backups/`.
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From the web UI: view all backups, trigger immediate backup, restore (current DB saved as pre-restore backup first).
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---
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## License
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[Elastic License 2.0](LICENSE) — free to use and self-host, not for resale as a managed service.
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---
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## Afternoon Session — vault1984 Strategy (13:00–13:11 ET)
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### vault1984 Architecture Decisions
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- **L2 single vault-level keypair confirmed** — not per-agent. Threat model = database theft, not agent compromise. Single keypair is correct.
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- **TOTP at L2 noted** — means every MCP client needs TOTP generation logic. Worth knowing before classifying.
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- **`crypto_box_seal` recommended** over rolling X25519+AES-GCM manually.
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### vault1984 Product Structure (clarified)
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- `app/` = OSS core, will go on GitHub (private for now)
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- `website/` = marketing + managed service front-door, lives on Zurich
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- **Managed vault1984** = the monetization play. Johan hosts it, charges for it.
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- OSS core is the trust foundation (auditable); managed service is the product.
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- Migration between self-hosted ↔ managed is possible but no users yet so not a priority.
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### vault1984 Positioning (new, firm)
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- **Three parallel workstreams:** L2 implementation, website repositioning, browser extension (never started)
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- **Browser extension** must come AFTER L2 — would need rebuilding anyway once L2 ships
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- **Johan's role:** Supervisor/architect, not junior dev. Agents execute against his specs.
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- **Key insight:** "Database worthless to steal" applies equally to self-hosted and managed
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- **Managed pitch:** "We host it. We maintain it. We cannot read it." — strongest for managed, not just self-hosted
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- **1Password Okta incident** referenced: for vault1984, a server breach is a non-event. DB = noise.
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- **Affirmative framing wins** over defensive ("we can't be LastPass'd") — lead with what you ARE, not what you resist
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- **"The only hosted vault where the operator holds no keys"** — current best headline candidate
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### vault1984 Three HN Articles (Johan's idea)
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1. The breach argument (already drafted at `~/clawd/drafts/vault1984-hn-article.md`)
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2. Architecture deep-dive — WebAuthn PRF + HKDF + three tiers — for crypto/security audience
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3. Show HN launch post — when OSS ships on GitHub
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### vault1984 README as Leading Document
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- Johan decided: README is the canonical source of truth
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- Website is the designed version; HN articles are narrative versions; all derive from README
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- Existing README: AI-productivity-first, two-tier "Shared/Personal" model — wrong framing
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- **New README draft:** `~/clawd/drafts/vault1984-readme-draft.md`
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- Opens with Orwell quote + architectural thesis
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- Three-tier model: Tier 1 (Metadata), Tier 2 (Credentials/agent-readable), Tier 3 (Sealed/hardware-only)
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- Security model table updated for three tiers
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- Managed hosting section added
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- MCP section updated: token carries Tier 2 private key, agent decrypts locally
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### vault1984 Repo — Now on Git
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- Initialized at `/home/johan/dev/vault1984/` (outer monorepo, not app/ itself)
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- Remote: `git@zurich.inou.com:vault1984.git`
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- First commit: `bca8723 init: vault1984 monorepo skeleton + L2 agent encryption design`
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- app/, docs/, website/ remain as independent repos (have their own history)
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- Tracked in outer repo: .gitignore, Makefile, L2_AGENT_ENCRYPTION.md
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### Repositioning Subagent
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- Completed: `~/clawd/drafts/vault1984-repositioning.md`
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- Covers README issues (6 problems), website page-by-page rewrites, what to keep, draft copy
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- Option C headline recommended: "We cannot be LastPass'd. Mathematically."
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- NOTE: This was written before the "managed service is the product" clarification — some framing needs updating
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### Johan Personal Context (new)
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- **Lid van Provinciale Staten van Flevoland** — LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), ~2002–2006
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- Was in NL during the full LPF arc: Fortuyn assassination, 26-seat win, Balkenende I 87-day collapse
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- Moved to the US in **2013**, same year Iaso Backup was acquired by GFI/Insight Partners
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- Logged to `~/clawd/memory/johan-model.md`
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### Morning Briefing
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- Briefing posted, dashboard updated (id: 47ae94ab from overnight, plus morning update)
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- Zurich updated (21 packages), dev.inou.com DNS fixed
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- Signal retired; Discord is now sole briefing channel
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---
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## Afternoon Session (Mar 10, ~11am-1pm ET)
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### vault1984 Strategy Crystallized
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**Product structure:**
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- `app/` = OSS core, private GitHub (not yet public)
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- `website/` = marketing + managed hosting frontend, lives on Zurich
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- Managed vault1984 = the monetization play — hosted service with cryptographic guarantees even operator can't read
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- Migration between self-hosted and managed: possible but no users yet, not a priority
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**Repositioning thesis:**
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- Lead: "The only hosted vault where the operator holds no keys" — architecture, not policy
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- Orwell quote stays as the soul
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- "Stolen database = worthless ciphertext" is a feature, not a defense
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- Incumbents are architecturally trapped — their business model requires server authority
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- Managed pitch is STRONGER than self-hosted: "We host it. We cannot read it."
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**README as leading document:**
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- README is canonical source of truth
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- Website = designed version of same content
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- HN articles = narrative versions
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- Draft written: `~/clawd/drafts/vault1984-readme-draft.md`
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- Old README: AI-productivity framing, "Shared/Personal" two-tier model
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- New README: architecture-first, three tiers (Tier 1/2/3 naming)
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**Three HN articles identified:**
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1. The breach argument (already drafted) — structural problem + vault1984 as answer
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2. Architecture deep-dive — WebAuthn PRF, HKDF, three-tier model — crypto/security audience
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3. Show HN launch post — when OSS ships
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**Repositioning doc:** `~/clawd/drafts/vault1984-repositioning.md` (subagent-generated)
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**Johan's role:** Supervisor/architect, not junior developer. Agents execute against his specs.
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**Three parallel workstreams:**
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1. Implement L2 (spec in L2_AGENT_ENCRYPTION.md)
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2. Website repositioning + onboarding
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3. Browser extension (Johan hasn't started this yet)
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### Johan Personal Context Added
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- **Lid van Provinciale Staten van Flevoland** — LPF party, ~2002–2006
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- Witnessed full LPF arc: Fortuyn assassination, 26-seat win, Balkenende I 87-day collapse
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- Moved to US in 2013, same year Iaso Backup was acquired by GFI/Insight Partners
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- Dutch citizen in Florida since 2013
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- Logged in `memory/johan-model.md`
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### vault1984 Git Setup
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- Outer repo initialized: `/home/johan/dev/vault1984/`
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- Remote: `git@zurich.inou.com:vault1984.git`
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- Tracks: `.gitignore`, `Makefile`, `L2_AGENT_ENCRYPTION.md`
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- `app/`, `docs/`, `website/` remain as independent repos (all have own git history)
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- First commit: `bca8723 init: vault1984 monorepo skeleton + L2 agent encryption design`
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### Decision: Technical/Marketing Writer Subagent
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- Johan proposed spinning up a dedicated technical/marketing writer subagent for vault1984
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- Goal: tighter context, specialized writing focus
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- All vault1984 writing tasks (README, HN articles, website copy) to route through this agent
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{
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"last_updated": "2026-03-10T16:00:01.794533Z",
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"last_updated": "2026-03-10T22:00:01.889286Z",
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"source": "api",
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"session_percent": 5,
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"session_resets": "2026-03-10T19:00:00.749955+00:00",
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"weekly_percent": 65,
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"weekly_resets": "2026-03-13T03:00:00.749984+00:00",
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"sonnet_percent": 50
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"session_percent": 14,
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"session_resets": "2026-03-11T00:00:00.843709+00:00",
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"weekly_percent": 69,
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"weekly_resets": "2026-03-13T02:59:59.843732+00:00",
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"sonnet_percent": 53
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}
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@ -1 +1 @@
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1773072228
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1773158610
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
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"lastDocInbox": "2026-02-25T22:01:42.532628Z",
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"lastTechScan": 1773068932,
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"lastMemoryReview": "2026-03-10T12:10:06.000Z",
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"lastIntraDayXScan": "2026-03-09T20:06:37.000Z",
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"lastIntraDayXScan": "2026-03-10T21:59:00.000Z",
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"lastInouSuggestion": "2026-03-09T15:04:00.000Z",
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"lastEmail": 1772132453,
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"pendingBriefingItems": [],
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@ -126,3 +126,13 @@
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---
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*Update this file immediately when new patterns emerge. Don't wait for Sunday.*
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---
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## Political Background
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- **Lid van Provinciale Staten van Flevoland** — LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), ~2002–2006
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- Member of provincial parliament during the most turbulent period in modern Dutch politics: Fortuyn assassination (May 6, 2002), LPF's 26-seat election win, Balkenende I 87-day collapse
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- Flevoland: youngest Dutch province, Almere/Lelystad electorate
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- Moved to the US in 2013, same year Iaso Backup was acquired by GFI/Insight Partners — likely the trigger
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- Provinciale Staten also elects the Eerste Kamer (Senate) — national weight to the role
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