package api

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"log"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"path/filepath"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"time"

	"github.com/johanj/vault1984/lib"
)

// base64Decode handles both standard and url-safe base64 (with or without padding).
func base64Decode(s string) ([]byte, error) {
	// Try url-safe first (no padding), then standard
	s = strings.TrimRight(s, "=")
	b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s)
	if err != nil {
		b, err = base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
	}
	return b, err
}

// base64UrlEncode encodes bytes as base64url without padding.
func base64UrlEncode(b []byte) string {
	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
}

type contextKey string

const (
	ctxActor    contextKey = "actor"
	ctxSession  contextKey = "session"
	ctxMCPToken contextKey = "mcp_token"
	ctxAgent    contextKey = "agent"
	ctxDB       contextKey = "db"
	ctxVaultKey contextKey = "vault_key"
	ctxVaultID  contextKey = "vault_id"
)

// ActorFromContext returns the actor type from request context.
func ActorFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
	v, ok := ctx.Value(ctxActor).(string)
	if !ok {
		return lib.ActorWeb
	}
	return v
}

// SessionFromContext returns the session from request context.
func SessionFromContext(ctx context.Context) *lib.Session {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxSession).(*lib.Session)
	return v
}

// MCPTokenFromContext returns the MCP token from request context (nil if normal session).
func MCPTokenFromContext(ctx context.Context) *lib.MCPToken {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxMCPToken).(*lib.MCPToken)
	return v
}

// AgentFromContext returns the agent from request context (nil if not an agent request).
func AgentFromContext(ctx context.Context) *lib.Agent {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxAgent).(*lib.Agent)
	return v
}

// DBFromContext returns the vault DB from request context (nil in self-hosted mode).
func DBFromContext(ctx context.Context) *lib.DB {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxDB).(*lib.DB)
	return v
}

// VaultKeyFromContext returns the derived vault key from request context (nil in self-hosted mode).
func VaultKeyFromContext(ctx context.Context) []byte {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxVaultKey).([]byte)
	return v
}

// VaultIDFromContext returns the vault ID from request context (0 in self-hosted mode).
func VaultIDFromContext(ctx context.Context) int64 {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxVaultID).(int64)
	return v
}

// L1Middleware extracts L1 from Bearer token and opens the vault DB.
// Fully stateless: L1 arrives with every request, is used, then forgotten.
// No sessions, no stored keys. The server has zero keys of its own.
//
// Self-hosted mode: finds vault DB by globbing vault1984-* files.
// Hosted mode: finds vault DB by base64url(L1[0:4]) → filename.
func L1Middleware(dataDir string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")

			// No auth = unauthenticated request (registration, login begin, etc.)
			if auth == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
				// Try to open vault DB without L1 (for unauthenticated endpoints)
				matches, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(dataDir, "vault1984-*"))
				if len(matches) > 0 {
					db, err := lib.OpenDB(matches[0])
					if err == nil {
						defer db.Close()
						ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxDB, db)
						next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
						return
					}
				}
				// Also try legacy .db files for migration
				matches, _ = filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(dataDir, "????????.db"))
				if len(matches) > 0 {
					db, err := lib.OpenDB(matches[0])
					if err == nil {
						defer db.Close()
						ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxDB, db)
						next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
						return
					}
				}
				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
				return
			}

			// Decode Bearer → L1 (8 bytes)
			bearerB64 := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
			l1Raw, err := base64Decode(bearerB64)
			if err != nil || len(l1Raw) != 8 {
				ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_l1", "Invalid L1 key in Bearer")
				return
			}

			// Normalize L1: 8 bytes → 16 bytes (same as crypto.js normalize_key)
			l1Key := lib.NormalizeKey(l1Raw)

			// Find vault DB by first 4 bytes of L1
			vaultPrefix := base64UrlEncode(l1Raw[:4])
			dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, "vault1984-"+vaultPrefix)

			var db *lib.DB
			if _, err := os.Stat(dbPath); err == nil {
				db, err = lib.OpenDB(dbPath)
				if err != nil {
					log.Printf("vault open error (%s): %v", dbPath, err)
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "db_error", "Failed to open vault")
					return
				}
			}
			if db == nil {
				ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusNotFound, "vault_not_found", "Vault not found")
				return
			}
			defer db.Close()

			ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxDB, db)
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxVaultKey, l1Key)
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxActor, lib.ActorWeb)

			// Agent-specific auth via X-Agent header
			agentName := r.Header.Get("X-Agent")
			if agentName != "" {
				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxActor, lib.ActorAgent)

				// Check vault-level lock
				vaultLock, _ := lib.VaultLockGet(db)
				if vaultLock != nil && vaultLock.Locked {
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "vault_locked",
						"Vault is locked: "+vaultLock.LockedReason)
					return
				}

				agent, err := lib.AgentGetByName(db, agentName)
				if err != nil {
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "agent_error", "Agent lookup failed")
					return
				}
				if agent == nil {
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unknown_agent", "Unknown agent")
					return
				}

				if agent.Status == lib.AgentStatusRevoked {
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "agent_revoked", "Agent has been revoked")
					return
				}
				if agent.Status == lib.AgentStatusLocked {
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "agent_locked",
						"Agent is locked: "+agent.LockedReason)
					return
				}

				// IP whitelist check
				ip := realIP(r)
				if len(agent.IPWhitelist) == 1 && agent.IPWhitelist[0] == "init" {
					lib.AgentUpdateWhitelist(db, int64(agent.ID), []string{ip})
					agent.IPWhitelist = []string{ip}
					lib.AuditLog(db, &lib.AuditEvent{
						Action: "agent_ip_init", Actor: lib.ActorAgent,
						IPAddr: ip, Title: agent.Name + " → " + ip,
					})
				}
				if !agentIPAllowed(agent, ip) {
					lib.VaultLockSet(db, true, "Non-whitelisted IP "+ip+" for agent "+agent.Name)
					lib.AgentUpdateStatus(db, int64(agent.ID), lib.AgentStatusLocked, "non-whitelisted IP: "+ip)
					lib.AuditLog(db, &lib.AuditEvent{
						Action: lib.ActionIPViolation, Actor: lib.ActorAgent,
						IPAddr: ip, Title: agent.Name,
					})
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusForbidden, "vault_locked",
						"Access from non-whitelisted IP. Vault locked.")
					return
				}

				// Rate limit
				reqPath := r.URL.Path
				lib.AgentRequestLog(db, int64(agent.ID), ip, reqPath)
				countMin, _ := lib.AgentRequestCountMinute(db, int64(agent.ID))
				countHour, _ := lib.AgentRequestCountHour(db, int64(agent.ID))
				if countMin > agent.RateLimitMinute || countHour > agent.RateLimitHour {
					lib.AgentUpdateStatus(db, int64(agent.ID), lib.AgentStatusLocked, "rate limit exceeded")
					lib.AuditLog(db, &lib.AuditEvent{
						Action: lib.ActionRateExceeded, Actor: lib.ActorAgent,
						IPAddr: ip, Title: agent.Name,
					})
					ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "agent_locked",
						"Rate limit exceeded. Agent locked.")
					return
				}

				lib.AgentUpdateLastUsed(db, int64(agent.ID), ip)
				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxAgent, agent)
			}

			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
		})
	}
}

// agentIPAllowed checks if the given IP is allowed by the agent's whitelist.
// Supports: single IPs, CIDR notation, DNS names.
func agentIPAllowed(agent *lib.Agent, ip string) bool {
	if len(agent.IPWhitelist) == 0 {
		return true
	}
	parsedIP := net.ParseIP(ip)
	for _, entry := range agent.IPWhitelist {
		// CIDR
		if strings.Contains(entry, "/") {
			_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(entry)
			if err == nil && parsedIP != nil && cidr.Contains(parsedIP) {
				return true
			}
			continue
		}
		// Single IP
		if net.ParseIP(entry) != nil {
			if entry == ip {
				return true
			}
			continue
		}
		// DNS name — resolve and compare
		addrs, err := net.LookupHost(entry)
		if err == nil {
			for _, addr := range addrs {
				if addr == ip {
					return true
				}
			}
		}
	}
	return false
}

// LoggingMiddleware logs HTTP requests.
func LoggingMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		start := time.Now()
		wrapped := &statusWriter{ResponseWriter: w, status: 200}
		next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
		log.Printf("%s %s %d %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path, wrapped.status, time.Since(start))
	})
}

type statusWriter struct {
	http.ResponseWriter
	status int
}

func (w *statusWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
	w.status = code
	w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}

// RateLimitMiddleware implements per-IP rate limiting.
func RateLimitMiddleware(requestsPerMinute int) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	var mu sync.Mutex
	clients := make(map[string]*rateLimitEntry)

	go func() {
		for {
			time.Sleep(time.Minute)
			mu.Lock()
			now := time.Now()
			for ip, entry := range clients {
				if now.Sub(entry.windowStart) > time.Minute {
					delete(clients, ip)
				}
			}
			mu.Unlock()
		}
	}()

	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			ip := realIP(r)

			mu.Lock()
			entry, exists := clients[ip]
			now := time.Now()
			if !exists || now.Sub(entry.windowStart) > time.Minute {
				entry = &rateLimitEntry{windowStart: now, count: 0}
				clients[ip] = entry
			}
			entry.count++
			count := entry.count
			mu.Unlock()

			if count > requestsPerMinute {
				ErrorResponse(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "rate_limited", "Too many requests")
				return
			}

			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		})
	}
}

type rateLimitEntry struct {
	windowStart time.Time
	count       int
}

// CORSMiddleware handles CORS headers.
func CORSMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")

		// Allow localhost and 127.0.0.1 for development
		if origin != "" && (strings.Contains(origin, "localhost") || strings.Contains(origin, "127.0.0.1")) {
			w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
			w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
		}

		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS")
		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Authorization, Content-Type")
		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")

		if r.Method == "OPTIONS" {
			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
			return
		}

		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// SecurityHeadersMiddleware adds security headers to all responses.
func SecurityHeadersMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
		w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
		w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")
		w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
		// CSP allowing localhost and 127.0.0.1 for development
		w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self' localhost 127.0.0.1")

		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// ErrorResponse sends a standard JSON error response.
func ErrorResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, code, message string) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(status)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
		"error": message,
		"code":  code,
	})
}

// JSONResponse sends a standard JSON success response.
func JSONResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, data any) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(status)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
}

func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
	if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
		parts := strings.SplitN(xff, ",", 2)
		return strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
	}
	if xri := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); xri != "" {
		return xri
	}
	addr := r.RemoteAddr
	if idx := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":"); idx != -1 {
		return addr[:idx]
	}
	return addr
}