82 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Show HN: Clavitor – Password manager with two-tier encryption for humans with AI assistants
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**TL;DR:** A password manager that knows your AI assistant needs your GitHub key, but doesn't need your CVV. Field-level encryption with WebAuthn PRF for L2 secrets. One Go binary, MIT licensed.
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---
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## The Problem
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Your Claude/Codex/Cursor agent needs credentials to deploy code, rotate keys, complete 2FA. But every existing password manager is all-or-nothing:
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- Give the AI your vault password → it sees everything (including your credit card)
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- Don't give it access → it can't do its job
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We needed per-field visibility. So we built it.
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---
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## Two-Tier Encryption
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**L1 (Credential Encryption):** Server-side key. AI-readable. API keys, SSH keys, TOTP secrets.
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**L2 (Identity Encryption):** WebAuthn PRF, client-side only. Card numbers, CVV, passport, private keys. The server literally cannot decrypt these — the key is derived from your Touch ID / Face ID / YubiKey in the browser and never leaves.
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Same entry. Two encryption tiers. The AI sees the GitHub token. It sees that you *have* an Amex card. It cannot see the card number.
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---
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## Technical Details
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- **One binary:** `clavitor` → SQLite file on port 1984. No Docker, no Postgres, no Redis.
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- **MCP-native:** `/mcp` endpoint with `get_credential()`, `get_totp()`, `check_expiring()`. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Codex.
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- **LLM import:** Native parsers for Chrome/Firefox/Bitwarden/Proton (12k+ entries instant). LLM fallback for any other format.
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- **Collision resolution:** Import from multiple sources, newest `timePasswordChanged` wins per entry.
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- **FIPS 140-3:** Go crypto with CNG/OpenSSL backends where available.
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---
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## Why This Matters
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LastPass lost encrypted vaults in 2022. Three years later, attackers are still cracking them — weak passwords first. FBI traced $150M+ in crypto theft to that single breach.
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Clavitor's L2 fields use WebAuthn PRF. The server never has the key. Even shell access to the box doesn't get your credit card numbers. Math, not policy.
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---
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## Quick Start
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```bash
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# Self-host in 30 seconds
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curl -fsSL clavitor.ai/install.sh | sh
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./clavitor
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# Running on http://localhost:1984
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# Claude Code MCP config
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~/.claude/mcp.json:
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"clavitor": {
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"command": "clavitor",
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"args": ["mcp"]
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}
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}
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}
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```
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---
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## Code & License
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- **GitHub:** https://github.com/johanj/clavitor
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- **License:** MIT
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- **Language:** Go 1.24
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- **Platforms:** Linux/amd64, Linux/arm64, Darwin/arm64, Darwin/amd64
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The port number is intentional.
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---
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## Questions?
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AMA in comments. Happy to discuss the WebAuthn PRF implementation, the MCP protocol design, or why we chose SQLite over "web scale" alternatives.
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