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Clavitor Principles

The contract every agent working on Clavitor accepts before touching code.

Document Version: 1.0
Last Updated: 2026-04-08
Change Log: See git log for history

This document is read on every fresh agent start. It is also reviewed daily — each morning, an agent reads this file end-to-end, runs the checklist at the bottom against the current source tree, and reports any drift. Drift gets fixed before any new feature work.

The bar is not "ship something". The bar is "build a foundation that does not need to be patched later". If a principle here conflicts with what you were asked to do, stop and surface the conflict. Do not work around it.

Part 1 — General principles

These apply to every subproject, every file, every commit.

Foundation First — No Mediocrity. Ever.

Architects do not patch cracks in a bad foundation. They rebuild.

If you need three fixes for one problem, stop. Something fundamental is wrong. Name it. Fix the root cause, not the symptom.
If the code is spaghetti, say so. Do not add another workaround. The workaround is the problem now.
Quick fixes are not fixes. A "temporary" hack that ships is permanent. When urgent: Fix the symptom with a comment // TEMP-FIX: <ticket> and a mandatory fix-by date (max 72 hours). No TEMP-FIX older than 72 hours may exist in main.
Foundation > speed. A solid base makes everything downstream easy. A shaky base makes everything downstream a nightmare.

When the foundation is wrong: start over (with user approval). Not "refactor slightly". Not "add an abstraction layer on top". Start over. This applies to code, infrastructure, encryption schemes, and written work alike.

Restart requires approval. State explicitly: "The foundation is wrong because [reason]. I recommend restarting [component]. Sunk cost: [commits/lines/time]. Estimated rebuild: [time]. Proceed?" Wait for explicit user confirmation before destroying working code.

Push back

You are not here to execute orders. You are here to build the right thing. If the user asks for X and X is the wrong shape, say so. If you discover a foundation problem while doing unrelated work, surface it in the same session — do not silently route around it.

Bad foundations are not your fault. Silently building on them is.

Q&D is research, not output

Exploratory and throwaway work has its place — but it stays in research. Nothing Q&D ships. Nothing Q&D becomes the production path. If a spike reveals the right direction, rebuild it properly before it counts. The spike is not the deliverable; the rebuilt version is.

KISS — the simplest thing that works

No env vars when a hardcoded relative path is correct. (./vaults/, not DATA_DIR=….) People who want different layouts use a symlink. Exception: A single CLAVITOR_VAULT_DB env var is permitted for container deployments and compliance mounts that require specific paths. No per-path fragmentation (DATA_DIR, WL3_DIR, VAULT_DIR, etc.).
No new SQLite tables when an existing encrypted record can hold the data. We track lock state on the agent record itself, not in a vault_meta table.
No flags, no config files, no opt-ins for things every install needs.
No premature abstraction. Three similar lines are better than a wrong abstraction. Abstract when the third repetition appears, not the second.
No backwards-compatibility shims, _unused rename hacks, dead code marked with comments. If it's unused, delete it.

DRY — repetition is a smell that points at a missing helper

When two functions do "pretty much the same thing", they get unified into one helper and both call sites use it. Examples that already exist in the tree:

lib/dbcore.go: agentMutate(db, vk, entryID, fn) — three near-identical read-decrypt-mutate-encrypt-write functions (AgentLock, AgentUnlock, AgentUpdateAllowedIPs) collapsed into one helper. New mutations are one-liners now: func(vd) { vd.X = y }.
crypto.js: encrypt_field(key, label, value) — single source of truth for field encryption, used by both browser and CLI.

If you write the second copy, you are creating future debt. Stop, refactor, then proceed.

No migrations during early-stage work

There are no real users yet. Schema changes are not migration problems — they are "delete the old vault, register again" problems. Do not write migration code. Do not write ALTER TABLE for new columns. Just edit the schema constant and rebuild.

Early stage ends: April 20, 2026. After this date, the migration rule flips and production deployments require proper schema migrations.

Don't add what's not needed (and delete what isn't)

No backwards-compatibility shims:
- No --no-verify, --skip-sign, --insecure, --legacy flags unless the user explicitly asks.
- No _oldName field rename hacks "for transition".
- No re-exports of types that moved.
- No // removed comments in place of deletion.
- No commented-out code "in case we need it again".
- If you delete it, delete it. git log is the rollback path.
Delete dead code (with approval):
- No orphaned files (not imported, not referenced, not executed).
- No unreachable functions (private, no callers in the codebase).
- No unused exports (public but no external importers).
- No dead CSS classes (not referenced in HTML/JS).
- No commented-out blocks >5 lines (anything that large should be deleted).
- Permission required: File deletion requires explicit user approval. State: "3 files/directories found unused. Recommend deletion:
  1. path/to/file1.html (orphaned, no references)
  2. path/to/file2.go (unreachable function)
  3. path/to/dir/ (empty) Proceed with deletion?"
- Verification: Part 4 Section G checks for unused files/functions.
Mandatory error handling with unique codes:
- Every if needs an else. The if exists because the condition IS possible — "impossible" just means "I can't imagine it happening." The else handles the case where your imagination was wrong.
- Use unique error codes: ToLog("ERR-12345: L3 unavailable in decrypt")
- When your "impossible" case triggers in production, you need to know exactly which assumption failed and where.

Error messages that actually help

Every error message shown to a user must be:

Uniquely recognizable — include an error code: ERR-12345: ...
Actionable — the user must know what to do next (retry, check input, wait, contact support)
Routed to the actor who can resolve it — don't tell end-users things only operators can fix

Bad: "Cannot perform action" — useless, no code, no next step, no routing.

Bad: "Server down" to an end-user — they can't fix it. This creates helplessness and support tickets.

Good (operator alert + user message):

[Alert to ops/monitoring]: ERR-50001: POP-ZRH vault DB unreachable — 3 failures in 60s

[User sees]: "Service temporarily unavailable. Our team has been alerted 
              and is working on it. Reference: ERR-50001. No need to open a ticket."

The user knows: (a) what happened, (b) it's being handled, (c) they don't need to act. This prevents unnecessary support load while keeping the user informed.

No validation at trusted internal boundaries. Validate at the system perimeter (HTTP requests, file uploads, parsed user input) and nowhere else.
No feature flags for hypothetical futures. Build what's asked, no more.
Docstrings where understanding requires tracing >2 files or non-local reasoning. If you had to grep across modules to figure out what a function does, the next reader will too — document it. Obvious single-file logic needs no comment.

Audit everything that matters

Every state change, every rejection, every strike, every lock, every admin action, every webhook receipt: audit-logged. The audit log is the forensic tool when something goes wrong. If it's not in the audit log, it didn't happen and you can't reconstruct it.

Audit format already in use: lib.AuditLog(db, &lib.AuditEvent{ Action: ..., Actor: ..., Title: ..., IPAddr: ..., EntryID: ... }).

Never delegate understanding

Don't write "based on the research, implement it" or "based on the findings, fix the bug". Those phrases push synthesis onto someone else (or onto a future agent). Write code that proves you understood: include file paths, line numbers, and what specifically to change.

Part 2 — Security: the cardinal rules

The threat model for Clavitor is a malicious skill that subverts an agent into harvesting credentials. Not random brute-forcers. Not script kiddies. The attacker is already inside the trust envelope — they're an authenticated agent with a real CVT token. Every defense in the system is built around slowing, detecting, and stopping that attacker.

Cardinal rule #1 — Security failures are LOUD

If decryption fails, exposure fails, or a signature mismatches: expose the failure. Never fall back to plaintext. Never silently continue. Never return a partial result that omits the failed item.

WRONG (fireable offense):

try {
    decrypted = await decrypt(ciphertext);
} catch (e) {
    decrypted = plaintext;  // NEVER
}

WRONG (also fireable):

func verifyWebhookSignature(r *http.Request) bool {
    return true // For now, accept all
}

CORRECT:

try {
    decrypted = await decrypt(ciphertext);
} catch (e) {
    decrypted = '[decryption failed]';  // user sees the failure
}

func verifyWebhookSignature(r *http.Request, body []byte) bool {
    secret := os.Getenv("PADDLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET")
    if secret == "" {
        log.Printf("PADDLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET not set; refusing webhook")
        return false  // refuse, log, never permit
    }
    // ... real HMAC verification ...
}

Failures must be noisy, visible, and blocking — never silent, hidden, or permissive. This applies to:

Encryption / decryption errors
Signature verification failures
Authentication failures
Tampering detection
Any security-critical operation

Cardinal rule #2 — The server is a dumb store

The vault server never holds full key material. The server's universe of secrets is limited to:

Tier	What	Server may hold
L0	4 bytes — vault file routing	Yes (sliced from `L1[:4]`)
L1	8 bytes — vault content encryption	Yes (in bearer token)
L2	16 bytes — agent decryption key	NEVER
L3	32 bytes — hardware-only key	NEVER
P1	8 bytes — public lookup token	Yes (browser computes & sends)
Master	32 bytes — full PRF output	NEVER

The server derives nothing. It receives what the browser sends, validates shapes, and persists. P1 is computed by the browser via HKDF and sent on the wire — the server does not know how to derive it because it does not have the master key. There is no lib.DeriveP1 function; if you find one, delete it.

The server is allowed to hold L1 because L1 is the bearer token used for per-entry encryption keys (DeriveEntryKey). L1 grants the ability to read vault content, but not the L2/L3 fields: L2 is the agent's own key (never leaves the C CLI / browser trust anchor), and L3 is a random 32-byte value the server has never seen in plaintext — it's only present in the WL3 file, wrapped with the user's PRF.

Cardinal rule #3 — The browser is the trust anchor

Every line of code that handles full key material lives in the browser (or the C CLI, which is its own trust anchor — see Part 3). The browser:

Generates a random 32-byte L3 at vault creation. L3 is pure entropy — not derived from anything. The PRF's job is to wrap L3, not to derive it.
Wraps L3 with the raw PRF output → opaque blob the server stores in WL3
Computes P1 = HKDF(master, "clavitor-p1-v1", 8 bytes)
Computes L1 = master[0:8]
Sends {l1, p1, wrapped_l3, credential_id, public_key} to the server
Holds L2/L3 in memory only during an active session, never persists them

The browser is the only place that ever sees:

The full master key
L2 plaintext
L3 plaintext

If a server-side function takes any of these as a parameter, that function is a veto violation. Delete it.

Exceptionally rare terms: The strings master_key, L3 (or l3_plaintext), and P3 should appear almost nowhere in the codebase. If you find yourself using them, stop. These are browser-only concepts. Their presence outside auth.js, crypto.js, or the C CLI is a sign of architectural drift.

Cardinal rule #3.5 — Cryptographic hygiene

FIPS 140-3 compliance: All cryptographic operations must be FIPS 140-3 validated or in the process of validation. This means:

Use standard library crypto (Go: crypto/ packages, C: OpenSSL FIPS module)
No custom cryptographic primitives
No home-grown key derivation or random number generation

Avoid CGO where possible: CGO (Go's C interoperability) creates build complexity, deployment friction, and audit surface. Prefer:

Pure Go implementations for new code
CGO only when FIPS mandates it (e.g., specific HSM integrations)
The C CLI (clavis-cli) is the only CGO-heavy component by design

Compiler optimizations: Standard memset or clear() may be optimized away. Use runtime.memclrNoHeapPointers (Go) or memset_explicit (C11) to ensure key material is actually cleared from memory.

Cardinal rule #4 — Three threats, no others

The owner is not a threat — they paid for the vault, they hold the keys, defending against them is self-DOS. The three threats below are the primary universe Clavitor defends against at the application layer. Infrastructure, supply chain, and social engineering are handled through operational security practices outside this codebase.

Threat A — Malicious skill harvesting through an authenticated agent

A subverted skill makes a real agent enumerate credentials. Attacker is already inside the trust envelope: valid CVT token, IP whitelist passes, normal-looking client.

Defenses:

Per-agent unique-entries quota (default 3/min, 10/hour). Repeats of the same credential are free; only distinct credentials count.
Two-strike lockdown: second hour-limit hit within 2h → agent locked, owner PRF unlock required. State persists in the encrypted agent record; restart does not reset.
Slow-harvest detection: An agent accessing >12 distinct credentials in any 24-hour period triggers an immediate audit alert (regardless of rate limits). This is a dark-red flag — normal agents need at most a dozen credentials.
L3 fields require keys the server has never seen (Threat B's defenses apply here too).
Owner-only endpoints exempt from global rate limit (agents blocked at the handler entry — rate-limiting that path defends against nothing).

When reasoning about a rate limit, ask: agent or owner? If owner, it's wrong.

Threat B — Vault file falls into the wrong hands

Stolen disk, stolen backup, hostile sysadmin, court order on a host. The attacker has every byte the server has. Result must be: useless ciphertext.

This works because keys are never co-located with the data they encrypt:

L1 lives nowhere on disk. Derived from the user's WebAuthn PRF; the PRF requires the physical authenticator. No keyfile, no recovery copy.
L2/L3 plaintext are absent from the server's universe at compile time (see the hard veto list and Part 4 → Section A).
WL3 holds wrapped_l3 = AES-256-GCM(L3, raw PRF). Without the authenticator, this is uniformly random ciphertext.
32-byte AES-256-GCM keys are not brute-forceable. ~10⁵⁷ years at 10¹² guesses/sec classically. Grover's quantum algorithm provides a square-root speedup, reducing effective security to that of a 128-bit classical cipher — still computationally infeasible (~10²⁹ years).
Backups use VACUUM INTO — same encrypted blobs, same property.

If you ever put L1, L2, L3, master_key, the raw PRF, or any decrypted field value into a log line, backup, metric, error message, audit row, or debug dump: you have broken Threat B. Stop.

Threat C — Agent token falls into the wrong hands

The CVT client credential (type 0x01: L2(16) + agent_id(16) + POP(4), encrypted with L0) is exfiltrated. The agent stores this locally; at request time it derives L1 = L2[:8] and mints a wire token to authenticate.

A stolen credential gives the attacker the agent's full decryption capability, not just authentication: L2 decrypts L2-flagged fields the agent fetches. This is a complete agent impersonation. They are the agent.

Defenses:

Per-agent IP whitelist. First contact fills the whitelist with the agent's source IP; every subsequent request must come from a listed IP, CIDR, or FQDN. A stolen credential used from anywhere else is refused at L1Middleware before any handler runs.
Threat A's defenses still apply: unique-entries quota throttles harvest attempts, two-strike lockdown stops sustained patterns. Refused-IP attempts are audit-logged for forensic review.
Owner revokes the agent at any time (admin-token gated, PRF tap).

Gap — Sub-vector C2 (credential theft at creation): When an agent is enrolled, the browser generates L2 and creates the type-0x01 credential. This token exists transiently in browser memory before being delivered to the agent. A malicious browser extension or XSS could exfiltrate it during this window.

Status: Acknowledged. The token exists in memory while the user is logged in (with L3 in sessionStorage), so side-channel delivery (QR, file+scp) doesn't eliminate the risk — it just moves it. Full mitigation requires a hardware attestation flow not implemented in current stage. Deferred until post-April 20 as current IP whitelist + rate limits provide sufficient baseline defense.

L3 fields remain unreachable — L2 does not unlock L3.

A perfect attacker (same IP, same access cadence, same scope of reads) is indistinguishable from the legitimate agent until the owner reviews the audit log. Whitelist + rate limit + audit are layered on purpose — no single defense carries the full load.

The WL3 corpus (wrapped L3 + lookup metadata) contains only cryptographic material. No customer ID, no name, no email, no slot ID. The link from a credential to a human lives only in the central admin DB. Delete the central record → the WL3 file becomes a mathematically-orphan blob with no possible link to a person. Functionally anonymous.

This is not a GDPR risk we tolerate. It is a property we get for free because we designed the data out of the WL3 file.

If you ever add a personal-data field to the WL3 schema, you have just made the entire WL3 corpus subject to GDPR deletion requests, retention rules, and audit obligations across every POP that mirrors it. Do not.

Cardinal rule #6 — Admin/sync traffic is not public

Anything sensitive between central and POPs runs over Tailscale, not public 443. The admin endpoints listen only on the Tailscale interface. Public clavitor.ai serves users; the ops control plane is invisible to the internet.

App-level HMAC on top of Tailscale is defense-in-depth — if a tailnet node is ever compromised, the per-POP shared secret is the second lock. Both layers required, neither optional.

Cardinal rule #7 — Webhooks are signed or refused

Every inbound webhook (Paddle, future integrations) verifies a cryptographic signature against a stored secret. If the secret is missing, refuse. If the signature is missing, refuse. If the signature mismatches, refuse. If the timestamp is outside ±5 minutes of now (anti-replay), refuse. If the body has been touched between read and verify, refuse.

There is no debug mode that disables this. If you need to develop locally against a webhook, set PADDLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=test-secret and craft a real signature with the test secret. The verification path is always on.

Part 3 — Per-subproject principles

Each subproject inherits Parts 1 and 2 in full. The sections below add what's specific to that subproject — what it owns, what it must never do, where its boundaries are.

`clavis-vault` — the Go vault binary

Owns:

The SQLite vault file at ./vaults/clavitor-<L0> (one per vault)
The WL3 credential JSON files at ./WL3/<shard>/<full-p1>.json
All HTTP API surface for entry CRUD, agents, audit, backups
L1-encrypted entry storage with per-entry HKDF-derived AES keys

Must never:

Hold L2 or L3 plaintext in memory or on disk
Receive a full master_key over the wire (only l1, p1, wrapped_l3)
Derive P1 itself — receives from the browser
Serve admin/sync endpoints on a public listener (Tailscale-only)
Have functions named MintCredential, ParseCredential, CredentialToWire (those handle L2 plaintext; if needed at all they live in the browser/CLI)
Contain lib.DeriveP1
Auto-create data/ directories — vault files live in ./vaults/ only
Have // removed comments where code used to live
Have a _old/ directory (deleted; never recreate)

Edition split:

Community (default build): no Tailscale, no central, no replication, no enrollment tokens. Self-hosted, single-node.
Commercial (-tags commercial): adds replication, enrollment gating, central WL3 sync. All commercial-only code lives behind build tags and inside edition/commercial.go (or similar).

Per-agent harvester defense:

lib.AgentData.RateLimit = max unique entries/minute (default 3 at creation)
lib.AgentData.RateLimitHour = max unique entries/hour (default 10)
Per-minute hit → 429, soft throttle, no strike
Per-hour hit → 429, strike recorded in LastStrikeAt
Second strike within 2 hours → Locked = true, persisted, 423 Locked on every subsequent request from that agent until owner PRF-unlocks
Enforced in handlers that read decrypted credentials: GetEntry, MatchURL, HandleListAlternates. Any new handler that returns decrypted credential data MUST call agentReadEntry(agent, entryID, db, vk) after the scope check.

Rate-limit exemptions:

/api/entries/batch is exempt from the global per-(IP, method, path) rate limit. The reason is not "owner is trusted" — the reason is that CreateEntryBatch returns 403 to any agent at the top of the handler, so this path is owner-only by handler enforcement, and the agent harvester defense lives elsewhere. If you reintroduce a rate limit on this path, you will DOS the import flow with no defense gained. There is a comment in api/middleware.go explaining this. Read it before touching.

`clavis-cli` — the C+JS command-line client

Owns:

C wrapper around an embedded JS engine
src/cvt.c — full C implementation of CVT envelope parsing/minting (cvt_parse_credential, cvt_build_wire)
crypto/crypto.js — JS crypto via the embedded engine, mirrors the browser's crypto.js exactly
Local credential storage on the CLI host

Must never:

Bridge to Go for any cryptographic operation. The CLI is a self-contained trust anchor. If you find yourself wanting to call into the Go vault binary for crypto, stop — implement it in C/JS instead.
Hold L1 from the user's vault unencrypted on disk — credentials are stored as type-0x01 CVT tokens, encrypted with L0
Send L2 or L3 over the network — only ever sends type-0x00 wire tokens (L1 + agent_id) to the vault

Single source of truth:

The CVT envelope format is documented in src/cvt.h and implemented in C there. The Go vault has its own implementation in lib/cvt.go for the wire token (0x00) only. The L2-bearing client credential type (0x01) is not implemented in Go and must never be. Two implementations of the wire token are tolerated because they're cross-language; the L2 credential staying single-language is a hard veto.

`clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web` — the embedded web frontend

Owns:

auth.js — WebAuthn + PRF, master key derivation, P1, L3 wrapping
crypto.js — single source of truth for field encryption (browser side)
import.js + importers.js + importers-parsers.js — all import parsing and field encryption (the Go server has zero importer code)
All views: vault list, entry detail, agents, security, tokens, audit

Must never:

Send master_key to the server (send l1 + p1 + wrapped_l3)
Persist L2 or L3 to localStorage or IndexedDB. Master key lives in sessionStorage only — wiped on tab close.
Hardcode the build version (it must come from /api/version, not a var BUILD = '...' constant in index.html)
Use silent fallback on decryption errors (show [decryption failed] in the field, not the encrypted bytes, not the empty string, not nothing)
Bypass the global api() helper for HTTP calls — that helper handles bearer auth, admin tokens, and 401 redirect uniformly

Build process:

JS files are embedded into the binary via go:embed. Editing JS requires rebuilding the Go binary. Run make dev from clavis-vault/. The Makefile validates JS syntax before building.
The build fails if JS has a syntax error. Do not commit code that fails the syntax check.

`clavis-chrome`, `clavis-firefox`, `clavis-safari` — browser extensions

Owns:

Form detection and field filling (content scripts)
Credential picker UI (popup)
Service worker for vault API calls

Must never:

Store L2 or L3 in any extension storage area (chrome.storage.local, chrome.storage.sync, chrome.storage.session). Active session keys live in memory only and die on service-worker restart.
Use a different field encryption than clavis-crypto / crypto.js. If the extension reimplements crypto, it WILL drift and corrupt fields.
Talk to the vault over HTTP. Always HTTPS, even on localhost (the vault serves a self-signed cert in dev).
Have permissions broader than what's strictly needed. If you ask for <all_urls> when https://*/* would do, fix it.

`clavis-crypto` — shared crypto primitives

Owns:

The canonical implementation of encrypt_field, decrypt_field, HKDF derivation, AES-GCM, and any other primitive used by browser code, the CLI, or extensions.
Tests that verify both browser-WebCrypto and CLI-BearSSL produce bit-identical output for the same inputs. This is the only thing keeping the two trust anchors in sync.

Must never:

Diverge between targets. If a primitive behaves differently in WebCrypto vs BearSSL, the bug is in clavis-crypto and it gets fixed there before any caller compensates.

`clavitor.ai/admin` — central admin / Paddle integration

Owns:

Customer hierarchy (MSP → end-customer → vault slots)
Subscription state and seat ledger
Vault registry: vault_slots table mapping (customer, slot_index, l0, pop)
Paddle webhook handler with signature verification
Enrollment token issuance (commercial)

Must never:

Hold any decryption material. Central is not a vault; it's a directory service. The wrapped L3 stored centrally (for distribution) is opaque to central.
Trust an inbound webhook without verifying its HMAC signature. Paddle webhook verification is mandatory; the secret comes from PADDLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET. If the env var is unset, every webhook is refused.
Accept admin operations from outside Tailscale. The vaults/claim, issue-token, wl3/since, wl3/full endpoints listen only on the tailnet interface.
Expose the Paddle API key, webhook secret, or any service credentials in client-side code. Server-side env only.

Vault slot lifecycle:

Slots are pre-created when a customer subscribes. A Family-5 plan creates 5 vault_slots rows immediately, all status='unused'.
When the owner names a slot ("Anna") and issues a token, the slot moves to status='pending' and the token gets stored on the POP (not central).
When Anna enrolls, the slot moves to status='active' and l0 is populated.
Cancellation/downgrade flows mark slots status='archived'. The vault data and WL3 file persist (we never delete) until an explicit GDPR request triggers a one-shot deletion script.

`clavis-android` / `clavis-ios` — mobile clients

Owns:

Native form-fill integration with platform autofill APIs
Local credential picker UI

Must never:

Implement crypto natively. Crypto goes through clavis-crypto (compiled for the platform) or an embedded JS engine running the same crypto.js. Two crypto implementations on the same platform is a guaranteed drift.
Persist L2 or L3 to platform keychains/keystores. The session key lives in memory; biometric unlock re-derives via PRF from the platform's WebAuthn equivalent.

`clavis-telemetry` — operator telemetry

Owns:

Heartbeat metrics from POPs to central
Per-POP system metrics (CPU, memory, disk, vault count)

Must never:

Send any vault content. Telemetry is operational, not data.
Send raw IP addresses of users. Aggregate counts only.
Run in community edition by default. Community is offline-by-default; telemetry is commercial-only and opt-in.

Part 4 — Daily review checklist

Run this every morning. Any check that fails is a foundation alert — fix before any new feature work.

Methodology evolution: These checks were historically grep-driven for reproducibility. With LLM analysis available, the daily reviewer must run a full LLM audit of all changed source files to catch semantic violations, not just pattern matches. Grep catches the letter; LLM catches the intent.

Procedure:

Run the automated tests (F1)
Run LLM analysis on all files changed since last review
Address any findings before new feature work

LLM Audit Prompt

Use this prompt with your LLM code review tool:

Review the following files for violations of CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md:
- Cardinal Rule #1: Security failures must be LOUD (no silent fallbacks)
- Cardinal Rule #2: Server never holds L2/L3/master_key
- Cardinal Rule #3: Browser is the trust anchor
- Cardinal Rule #4: Defenses against Threats A, B, C
- Part 1: KISS, DRY, no migrations, no backwards-compat shims

Focus on:
1. Security: Any key material (L1, L2, L3, master_key, PRF) flowing to logs,
   errors, or responses
2. Silent fallbacks: catch blocks that don't expose failures to users
3. DRY violations: Similar logic that should be unified
4. Trust boundaries: Server-side code that derives or handles full keys

Report any violations with file paths and line numbers.

Section A — Server hard vetos

A1. The server never receives master_key over the wire.

#!/bin/bash
# Verify server never sees full master key
matches=$(grep -r "master_key\|MasterKey\|masterKey" clavis-vault/api/ clavis-vault/lib/ --include="*.go" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "_test.go" | wc -l)
if [ "$matches" -gt 0 ]; then
    echo "❌ FAIL: master_key handling found on server ($matches matches)"
    grep -r "master_key\|MasterKey\|masterKey" clavis-vault/api/ clavis-vault/lib/ --include="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"
    exit 1
else
    echo "✅ PASS: No master_key handling on server"
fi

A2. lib.DeriveP1 does not exist on the server.

#!/bin/bash
# Check for forbidden P1 derivation on server
if grep -rn "DeriveP1\|derive_p1\|deriveP1" clavis-vault/lib/ clavis-vault/api/ 2>/dev/null; then
    echo "❌ FAIL: DeriveP1 found on server — P1 must be browser-only"
    exit 1
else
    echo "✅ PASS: No DeriveP1 on server"
fi

A3. L2-handling CVT functions do not exist on the server.

#!/bin/bash
# Check for forbidden L2 credential handling
if grep -rn "MintCredential\|ParseCredential\|CredentialToWire" \
    clavis-vault/api/ clavis-vault/lib/ 2>/dev/null; then
    echo "❌ FAIL: L2 credential functions found on server"
    exit 1
else
    echo "✅ PASS: No L2 credential functions on server"
fi

Expected: zero matches. The Go CVT module only handles type-0x00 wire tokens
(L1, agent_id). The L2-bearing type-0x01 is C-only in `clavis-cli/src/cvt.c`.

**A4. `AgentData` has no L2 field.**

grep -n "L2 *[]byte" clavis-vault/lib/types.go

Expected: zero matches. (Field-level `L2 bool` flag on `VaultField` is fine —
that's metadata, not key material.)

**A5. WL3 JSON contains no PII.**

grep -n "customer_id|name|email|slot_id" clavis-vault/lib/wl3.go

Expected: zero matches in field definitions of `WL3Entry`. Adding any of these
makes the entire WL3 corpus GDPR-scoped.

**A6. Keys are never logged or audited.**

Expected: zero matches. Threat B violation if any key material reaches a log,
metric, error message, or audit row — even in hex, even in debug builds.

**A7. Per-agent IP whitelist enforcement is on.**

grep -n "AgentIPAllowed|allowed_ips|AllowedIPs" clavis-vault/api/middleware.go

Expected: matches in `L1Middleware` showing first-contact fill + enforcement.
This is Threat C's primary defense. If the check is missing or commented out,
a stolen agent token works from anywhere on the internet.

### Section B — Silent fallback

**B1. No silent decryption fallback in browser code.**

grep -rn "catch.*plaintext|catch.ciphertext|catch.=.*null"
clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web/ clavis-chrome/ clavis-firefox/

Expected: any match must be reviewed. The acceptable pattern is
`catch (e) { result = '[decryption failed]'; }` — visible to the user.

**B2. No `return true` in security check stubs.**

grep -rn "return true.*//.TODO|return true.//.for now|return true.//.*accept"
clavitor.ai/admin/ clavis-vault/

Expected: zero matches. If you see one, you've found a SECURITY.md violation.
Implement it or delete the call site.

**B3. No commented-out security checks.**

grep -rn "// *if !verify|// *if !auth|// *return.*Forbidden"
clavis-vault/ clavitor.ai/admin/

Expected: zero matches.

**B4. No silent fallbacks in catch blocks (manual LLM review required).**

Grep catches patterns, not intent. All catch blocks in decryption/security paths
must be manually reviewed to ensure they don't silently swallow errors. The LLM
must verify: no `catch (e) { return data; }`, no `catch { decrypted = ""; }`,
no `finally` blocks that restore old values without logging.

### Section C — Test fixture security

**C0. Test fixture key material is obviously fake.**

Test data containing key material (L2, L3, master_key, PRF output):
- Must be instantly recognizable as test data (not production keys)
- **Pattern:** 32 identical bytes: `bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 32)` or `{0x00}`, `{0xFF}`, `{0xDE}, {0xAD}`
- **Never** use random-looking values that could be mistaken for real keys
- **Never** derive test keys from production material
- **Never** commit binary test fixtures (always text/SQL that shows the pattern)

Example:
```go
// GOOD - obviously fake
testL3 := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 32)
testMaster := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x00}, 32)

// BAD - looks like a real key
testL3 := []byte{0x4a, 0x9f, 0x2c, ...} // 32 random bytes

Section D — Foundation drift

C1. No _old/ directory.

find . -type d -name "_old"

Expected: zero results. Dead code is deleted, not parked.

C2. No env vars for fundamental paths.

grep -rn "os.Getenv(\"DATA_DIR\")\|os.Getenv(\"WL3_DIR\")" clavis-vault/lib/

Expected: zero matches. These are hardcoded in lib/config.go to vaults and WL3 respectively. Symlink if you want different paths.

C3. No migration code.

grep -rn "ALTER TABLE\|migration\|Migration" clavis-vault/lib/dbcore.go \
  | grep -v "// "

Expected: matches only inside MigrateDB for the existing alternate_for and verified_at columns (legacy from earlier work). No NEW ALTER TABLE should appear during early-stage development.

C4. Hardcoded build constants in HTML.

grep -rn "var BUILD = '" clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web/

Expected: zero matches. Build version must come from /api/version at runtime, not from a hardcoded constant that goes stale.

Section E — DRY violations

E1. Two functions doing the same thing.

This one is judgment-call, not greppable, but the daily reviewer should look for repeated patterns of:

read row from DB → unpack → mutate one field → repack → write
HTTP handler boilerplate (admin check, decode body, validate, audit, respond)
Crypto primitive wrappers that differ only by info string

If you see the third copy of any pattern, stop and refactor before adding the fourth.

The canonical example to model after: lib/dbcore.go:agentMutate — replaced three near-identical functions with a higher-order helper. Net negative line count, easier to add new mutations, single point of correctness.

E2. Two crypto implementations of the same primitive.

Browser code uses clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web/crypto.js. CLI uses clavis-cli/crypto/crypto.js. These should be byte-identical. If they diverge, the encrypted output diverges, and a credential created in one client becomes unreadable in the other.

diff clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web/crypto.js clavis-cli/crypto/crypto.js

Expected: zero diff (or, if intentionally different for a target-specific adapter, the difference is documented in clavis-crypto/README.md).

Section F — Threat model alignment

E1. Per-agent rate limits have safe defaults.

grep -n "RateLimit *: *3\|RateLimit *= *3\|RateLimitMinute.*3" \
  clavis-vault/api/handlers.go
grep -n "RateLimitHour *: *10\|RateLimitHour *= *10" \
  clavis-vault/api/handlers.go

Expected: matches in HandleCreateAgent. If the defaults drift (e.g. someone changes them to 0 = unlimited), the harvester defense is silently disabled for new agents.

E2. agentReadEntry is called from every credential-read handler.

For each handler that returns decrypted credential data, the call is mandatory. The current set:

GetEntry
MatchURL
HandleListAlternates

If you add a new handler that returns decrypted credentials and forget to call agentReadEntry, you have a harvester hole. Verify by greping:

grep -n "AgentCanAccess\|agentReadEntry" clavis-vault/api/handlers.go

Every credential-read handler must call both AgentCanAccess (before accessing data) and agentReadEntry (after decryption, before returning). Verify both functions appear in the handler code path.

E3. /api/entries/batch is exempt from global rate limit.

grep -A2 "/api/entries/batch" clavis-vault/api/middleware.go

Expected: a next.ServeHTTP(w, r); return block with the explanatory comment intact. If the comment is missing, the next reviewer will reintroduce the rate limit and break import.

Section F — Test posture

F1. All tests pass.

cd clavis-vault && go test ./lib/... ./api/...
cd clavitor.ai/admin && go test .

Expected: all green. Failing tests are foundation alerts, not "tomorrow" problems.

F2. JS syntax check passes.

cd clavis-vault && make build  # validates JS as part of build

Expected: no JS syntax error in output. JS files are embedded in the binary; syntax errors break the running app silently in some browsers.

F3. New code has tests.

Not greppable. Judgment call. The rule: if you added a new function with non-trivial logic, there should be a test for it in the same commit. The tests model what the function is supposed to do. If you can't write a test because "it's hard to test", the function is probably too coupled — refactor.

Section G — Dead code elimination

G1. No empty directories.

find . -type d -empty | grep -v ".git" | grep -v "vendor"

Expected: zero results. Empty directories are deleted.

G2. No orphaned HTML/JS/CSS files (with exceptions).

# Find HTML files not referenced in Go code
# Exceptions: design-system/, marketing/, test-*.html (dev/test files)
for f in $(find . -name "*.html" | grep -v vendor | grep -v "design-system" | grep -v "marketing" | grep -v "test-"); do
  name=$(basename "$f")
  if ! grep -r "$name" --include="*.go" . 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
    echo "Orphaned: $f"
  fi
done

Review any matches — may be standalone pages or may be dead.

Exceptions (intentionally not checked):

design-system/ — standalone design documentation, not embedded
marketing/ — marketing assets, separate from application
test-*.html — development/test files (manual review for cleanup)

G3. No unreachable Go functions (requires go-dead-code or similar tool). Manual check: review private functions (lowercase) with no callers in the same package. Public functions with no importers are also suspicious — verify they are API endpoints or intentionally exported.

G4. No commented-out blocks >5 lines.

grep -rn "^\s*//\s*\w" --include="*.go" --include="*.js" . | \
  awk -F: '{print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -20

Review files with many commented lines — likely dead code.

Part 5 — How to add a new principle

When a new lesson surfaces (today's "rate limit is for the agent, not the owner" was one), add it here in the same session:

Pick the right section: General (Part 1), Cardinal (Part 2), or subproject-specific (Part 3).
State the principle in one sentence at the top of the entry.
Explain WHY in 1–3 sentences. The reasoning matters more than the rule — future reviewers need it to apply the principle correctly to new situations.
If the principle is auditable, add a grep check to Part 4.
Reference the incident or insight that surfaced the principle (commit hash, issue number, or session date).

Principles are additive. Don't delete old ones to make room — they exist because something went wrong once. If a principle is genuinely obsolete:

Deprecation format:

### **DEPRECATED** — Original Principle Name
**Deprecated:** 2026-04-08  
**Reason:** Early stage ended — migration code now required  
**Authorized by:** Johan  
**Replacement:** See "Schema migrations" in Part 8 (when written)

[original principle text preserved below...]

Deprecated principles remain in place for 90 days, then move to Appendix A
A deprecated principle's grep checks in Part 4 are commented out with reason
Deprecation requires explicit user approval (state: "Deprecating principle X because Y. Authorized by you?")

Part 6 — When you have to violate a principle

You can't always honor every principle. Sometimes the principles themselves conflict. When that happens:

Surface the conflict to the user. Don't choose silently.
Pick the principle with the higher consequence. Security vetos beat DRY. Foundation rules beat KISS. The Cardinal Rules in Part 2 beat everything else.
Document the violation in the code itself, with a comment explaining what principle was broken, why, and what would have to be true for the violation to be reversed.
Add a TODO to the daily checklist so the violation is reviewed tomorrow and either fixed or formally accepted.

Example of an acceptable, documented violation: the IP whitelist first-contact race in api/middleware.go — there's a 30-line comment explaining that the race is theoretically possible, why it cannot be reproduced in practice, and why fixing it would require complexity disproportionate to the threat. The violation is acknowledged, scoped, and dated.

Escalation and post-hoc discovery

User disagreement: If the user insists on a lower-consequence principle over a higher one (e.g., speed over security), escalate to project owner (Johan) before proceeding. Document the override in the PR description.

Post-hoc discovery: If you find a committed violation during daily review:

Assess if it's actively dangerous (security veto) — if yes, escalate immediately
If not dangerous, add to TODO and address in current sprint
Never leave a violation undocumented for >24 hours

Equal consequence conflicts: When two principles of equal tier conflict, prefer the one that preserves user agency and data integrity.

Severe security violations: For critical security breaches (harvester detected, token compromise, unauthorized data exfiltration):

Immediate escalation to Johan
Consider permanent ban of the agent and/or all agents running on that model
Quarantine affected vault(s) until forensic review complete
Legal/compliance review if customer data was accessed

Part 7 — Incident Response

When a security event is detected, the system and operators respond according to these procedures. Every response action is audit-logged.

Agent compromise detection (Threat A)

When an agent triggers harvester defenses:

Rate limit hit (per-minute) → 429 Too Many Requests
- Agent receives: "Rate limit exceeded — slow down"
- Audit log: action=agent_rate_limit_minute, actor=agent_id, entry_id=requested_entry
Hour-limit hit (first strike) → 429 + strike recorded
- Agent receives: "Rate limit exceeded — warning recorded"
- Audit log: action=agent_strike_1, actor=agent_id, last_strike_at=now
- Agent remains functional
Second strike within 2 hours → Agent locked
- Agent receives: 423 Locked with message:
```
"This agent has been locked due to suspicious activity. 
Contact the vault owner to restore access."
```
- Audit log: action=agent_locked, actor=agent_id, reason=second_strike
- All subsequent requests from this agent return 423 until unlocked
Owner unlock procedure
- Owner performs PRF tap (WebAuthn assertion)
- POST /api/agents/{id}/unlock with admin token
- Agent's Locked=false, LastStrikeAt=null, StrikeCount=0
- Audit log: action=agent_unlocked, actor=owner_prf, entry_id=agent_id
- Agent may retry from clean slate

Post-incident review

After any agent lock event:

Review audit logs for the 2-hour window before lock
Identify accessed entries and their sensitivity (scope classification)
If any financial/admin credentials accessed: force rotation of those credentials
Document findings in incident tracker (outside this codebase)

Token compromise (Threat C)

When a stolen agent token is used from an unauthorized IP:

IP whitelist rejection → 403 Forbidden
- Response: "Request from unauthorized IP — token may be compromised"
- Audit log: action=agent_ip_rejected, actor=agent_id, ip_addr=source_ip, allowed_ips=[whitelist]
Owner notification (commercial edition)
- Alert POST to central: alert=potential_token_theft, agent_id, source_ip, timestamp
- Central emails owner with instructions to revoke agent
Revocation
- Owner performs PRF tap
- DELETE /api/agents/{id} with admin token
- All tokens for this agent invalidated
- Audit log: action=agent_revoked, actor=owner_prf, reason=token_compromise_suspected

Emergency procedures

Owner locked out (lost authenticator):

No self-service recovery. Contact support with identity verification.
Support triggers vault_recover procedure (offline, requires two operators).
New vault created, credentials imported from backups (if available).

Complete vault compromise suspected:

Rotate all credentials in vault immediately
Archive vault, create new vault with new L0
Investigation mode: all agent access suspended until root cause identified

Part 8 — Compliance & Data Governance

Data retention by customer tier

Data type	Paying customers	Non-paying (community)	Rationale
Vault content	Until deletion + 30 days	Until deletion + 7 days	Business continuity vs storage costs
Audit logs	7 years (SOC 2/SOX)	90 days	Regulatory requirement vs convenience
Failed auth	90 days	30 days	Threat analysis window
Backups	30 days rolling	7 days rolling	Disaster recovery needs
Telemetry	90 days	None	Commercial optimization only

Non-paying users accept reduced retention as a trade-off for free service. Upgrade to commercial = full compliance coverage.

Cross-border transfers

Zurich central as anchor: Our central infrastructure is in Zurich, Switzerland. This addresses most compliance concerns:

Swiss data protection (adequate under EU GDPR)
POPs are data processing extensions, not independent controllers
No EU→US transfer issues for European customers
Asian customers: POPs hold encrypted WL3 only (no PII), minimal exposure

Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) in place for enterprise customers who require them. Default terms cover most use cases without additional paperwork.

Part 9 — Localization (i18n/l10n)

Status: English-first, limited localization

Current priority:

✅ Error message codes (ERR-12345) — universal, no translation needed
✅ CLI output — English only (dev/ops audience)
✅ Web UI — English only (for now)
❌ RTL (Arabic/Hebrew) — not a priority for initial markets
❌ Full UI translation — future phase, post-product-market-fit

Form field detection — core feature

Browser extension form detection is intentionally unaddressed in this document. It is a core product feature that will evolve through:

W3C autocomplete attribute support (universal)
ML-based field classification (language-agnostic)
Community contribution for locale-specific heuristics

We do not mandate specific implementation here because rapid iteration is required. The feature will mature separately from these architectural principles.

Part 10 — Git workflow

Commit philosophy

Commit early, commit often. A commit is a save point, not a publish event.

One logical change per commit — don't mix bug fix + refactoring + new feature
If you can't explain the commit in one sentence, it's too big — split it
Work-in-progress commits are fine locally; clean up before sharing

Commit message format

<subject>: <what changed>

<body>: <why it changed> (optional but encouraged)

<footer>: <references> (issue #123, fixes, etc.)

Subject line rules:

Imperative mood: "Add rate limiter" not "Added rate limiter"
No period at end
Max 50 characters (GitHub truncates at 72)
Prefix with area: api:, lib:, web:, crypto:, docs:

Good:

api: add per-agent IP whitelist middleware

Implements Threat C defense: first contact fills whitelist,
subsequent requests rejected if IP not in list. Supports CIDR
and FQDN in addition to exact IPs.

Fixes #456

Bad:

changes

lots of changes to the code including some fixes and also 
refactored the handler and added new feature for agents

When to commit vs. amend

Amend (rewrite history) for:

Fix typo in commit you just made
Add file you forgot to stage
Improve commit message

New commit for:

Any change that has been pushed (even to your own branch)
Changes that logically separate from previous work
Anything another developer might have based work on

Push guidelines

Never force push to main or master. Ever.

Branch workflow:

Create feature branch: git checkout -b feature/agent-lockdown
Commit work-in-progress freely
Before push: git rebase -i main to clean up (squash "fix typo" commits)
Push branch: git push -u origin feature/agent-lockdown
Open PR (when we have CI), or merge with --no-ff for feature visibility

Destructive operations require explicit approval:

git reset --hard
git push --force (any branch)
git filter-branch or git filter-repo
Branch deletion with unmerged commits

State: "About to [destructive operation] on [branch]. This will [effect]. Alternative: [safer option]. Proceed?"

Repository hygiene

What we commit:

Source code
Generated code that's not reproducible (rare)
Documentation
Configuration templates (.env.example, not .env)

What we DO NOT commit:

Secrets (keys, passwords, tokens)
Build artifacts (*.o, *.a, binaries)
Dependencies (vendor them or use go.mod)
User data, vault files, logs

.gitignore maintenance:

If a file is generated or contains secrets, add it to .gitignore
Review git status before every commit — nothing should surprise you

Signed commits (future)

When we add contributor access beyond core team, signed commits (SSH or GPG) will be required. All commits must be verifiable.

Agent-authored PRs (AI-as-contributor)

Since agents (AI assistants) do much of the implementation work, agents should author their own PRs with full context. This creates an auditable trail of AI decision-making.

Agent PR workflow:

# Agent does the work
1. git checkout -b sarah/rate-limit-defense-20250408
2. [make changes per CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md]
3. git commit -m "api: add per-agent rate limiting and lockdown

Implements Threat A defense per CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md Part 2.
- Rate limit: 3/min, 10/hour distinct entries
- Two-strike lockdown within 2h window
- Locked state persisted in encrypted agent record

Author: Sarah <sarah-20250408-001>"
4. git push -u origin sarah/rate-limit-defense-20250408
5. gh pr create --title "Sarah: Add per-agent rate limiting" \
   --body "$(cat <<'EOF'
## Summary
Implements harvester defense per Cardinal Rule #4.

## Changes
- `lib/types.go`: Add RateLimit, RateLimitHour, Locked fields to AgentData
- `api/middleware.go`: Per-agent rate limiting in L1Middleware
- `api/handlers.go`: agentReadEntry call for credential reads

## Security Review Checklist
- [x] Rate limits default to safe values (3/min, 10/hr)
- [x] No L2/L3 material on server (verified via Part 4 checks)
- [x] Audit logging on all state changes
- [x] IP whitelist enforcement unchanged

## Test Plan
- Create agent with default limits
- Trigger rate limit → expect 429
- Trigger second strike → expect 423 Locked
- Verify lock persists after vault restart

## Documentation
- CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md Part 7 updated with unlock procedure

## Risks
- False positive lock: owner can PRF-unlock via admin endpoint
- First-contact IP race: accepted risk per existing comment
EOF
)"

PR template for agents:

Create .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE/agent_pr_template.md:

## Agent Identity
- Agent name: <!-- Sarah, Charles, Maria, James, Emma, Arthur, Victoria -->
- Session ID: <!-- name-YYYYMMDD-NNN, e.g., sarah-20250408-001 -->
- Model: <!-- Claude, Kimi, etc. (implementation detail, not important) -->
- Principles reviewed: CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md v<!-- version -->
- Daily checks: <!-- date agent ran Part 4 -->

## Summary
<!-- One paragraph: what and why -->

## Changes
<!-- Bullet list of files changed and key logic -->

## Security Review Checklist
- [ ] No server-side L2/L3 handling (A1-A3)
- [ ] Security failures are LOUD (Cardinal Rule #1)
- [ ] No key material in logs (A6)
- [ ] Error handling has unique codes (Part 1)
- [ ] DRY violations checked (Section E)
- [ ] Test coverage for new logic

## Verification
<!-- How you tested, or why testing is deferred -->

## Risks & Mitigations
<!-- What could go wrong, how it's handled -->

## Principle References
<!-- Which parts of CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md this implements or modifies -->

Agent naming convention

Agents have persona names — like team members, not tools. This makes git history readable and creates consistent ownership.

Name	Domain	Specialty	Voice
Sarah	`clavis-vault`	Core vault, API, middleware	Precise, security-focused
Charles	`clavis-cli`	C CLI, embedded JS, tooling	Systems-level, thorough
Maria	`clavis-crypto`	Cryptography, primitives	Rigorous, mathematical
James	`clavis-chrome/firefox/safari`	Browser extensions, UX	User-focused, detail-oriented
Emma	`clavitor.ai/admin`	Central, Paddle, POP sync	Business logic, reliability
Arthur	Architecture	Cross-cutting design, principles	Strategic, big-picture
Victoria	Security reviews	Threat model, audits, hardening	Skeptical, uncompromising
Luna	Design	UI/UX, CSS, visual systems	Aesthetic, user-empathetic
Thomas	Documentation	Technical writing, guides, API docs	Clear, pedagogical, thorough
Hugo	Legal	Compliance, privacy policy, terms, licensing	Cautious, precise, risk-aware

Why persona names:

Release notes read like a team: "Sarah added rate limiting, Charles fixed CLI build"

How agents know their name

Primary rule: Directory-based auto-detection

Working directory → Agent name
clavis/clavis-vault/*           → Sarah
clavis/clavis-cli/*             → Charles
clavis/clavis-crypto/*          → Maria
clavis/clavis-chrome/*          → James
clavis/clavis-firefox/*         → James
clavis/clavis-safari/*          → James
clavitor.ai/*                   → Emma
marketing/*, design-system/*    → Luna
docs/*, *.md (root level)       → Thomas
legal/*, LICENSE*, PRIVACY*     → Hugo
CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md changes  → Arthur or Victoria (depending on nature)

Override rules (explicit wins over implicit):

User statement: "Victoria, review this PR for security issues" → Victoria
Multiple directories touched: Use architect-agent file or user specifies
Root-level changes: Check .agent-name file in repo root, or ask user

.agent-name file (optional override):

Create in any directory to fix identity:

echo "Luna" > clavis/clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web/.agent-name
# Now Luna owns all web UI changes here, even though it's in vault/

When uncertain:

Agent asks: "I'm working on files in [paths]. Based on the directory structure, I believe I'm [Name]. Confirm or correct?"

Examples:

Editing clavis/clavis-vault/lib/dbcore.go → "I'm Sarah. Confirm?"
Editing docs/SECURITY.md → "I'm Thomas. Confirm?"
Editing CLAVITOR-PRINCIPLES.md → "This is an architecture/principle change — should I be Arthur or Victoria?"
You learn who to expect for what: "Maria is touching crypto → extra review needed"
Natural language: "Ask Sarah to look at the vault middleware"

Commit signature format:

Author: Sarah <sarah-20250408-001>
Author: Charles <charles-20250408-003>

Session ID format: name-YYYYMMDD-NNN (001, 002... for multiple sessions/day)

Human review points:

Even agent-authored PRs require human approval before merge:

Security-critical changes → Johan must approve
Schema/data model changes → Review for migration impact
New principles added → Ensure they follow Part 5 format
Violations noted → Confirm documented in Part 6 style

Agent merge authority:

Currently: No auto-merge. All PRs require human approval. Future state: Agents may merge their own PRs for:

Documentation fixes
Test additions
Trivial refactors (no logic change)
Daily drift fixes (Part 4 violations)

With safety rules:

Never merge to main directly
Always through PR with CI passing
No merge if PR contains "SECURITY" or "veto" in review comments

Foundation First. No mediocrity. Ever.

59 KiB Raw Blame History Unescape Escape

Clavitor Principles

Part 1 — General principles

Foundation First — No Mediocrity. Ever.

Push back

Q&D is research, not output

KISS — the simplest thing that works

DRY — repetition is a smell that points at a missing helper

No migrations during early-stage work

Don't add what's not needed (and delete what isn't)

Error messages that actually help

Audit everything that matters

Never delegate understanding

Part 2 — Security: the cardinal rules

Cardinal rule #1 — Security failures are LOUD

Cardinal rule #2 — The server is a dumb store

Cardinal rule #3 — The browser is the trust anchor

Cardinal rule #3.5 — Cryptographic hygiene

Cardinal rule #4 — Three threats, no others

Threat A — Malicious skill harvesting through an authenticated agent

Threat B — Vault file falls into the wrong hands

Threat C — Agent token falls into the wrong hands

Cardinal rule #5 — WL3 is GDPR-out-of-scope by design

Cardinal rule #6 — Admin/sync traffic is not public

Cardinal rule #7 — Webhooks are signed or refused

Part 3 — Per-subproject principles

clavis-vault — the Go vault binary

clavis-cli — the C+JS command-line client

clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web — the embedded web frontend

clavis-chrome, clavis-firefox, clavis-safari — browser extensions

clavis-crypto — shared crypto primitives

clavitor.ai/admin — central admin / Paddle integration

clavis-android / clavis-ios — mobile clients

clavis-telemetry — operator telemetry

Part 4 — Daily review checklist

LLM Audit Prompt

Section A — Server hard vetos

Section D — Foundation drift

Section E — DRY violations

Section F — Threat model alignment

Section F — Test posture

Section G — Dead code elimination

Part 5 — How to add a new principle

Part 6 — When you have to violate a principle

Escalation and post-hoc discovery

Part 7 — Incident Response

Agent compromise detection (Threat A)

Post-incident review

Token compromise (Threat C)

Emergency procedures

Part 8 — Compliance & Data Governance

Data retention by customer tier

Cross-border transfers

Part 9 — Localization (i18n/l10n)

Status: English-first, limited localization

Form field detection — core feature

Part 10 — Git workflow

Commit philosophy

Commit message format

When to commit vs. amend

Push guidelines

Repository hygiene

Signed commits (future)

Agent-authored PRs (AI-as-contributor)

Agent naming convention

How agents know their name

59 KiB

Raw Blame History

`clavis-vault` — the Go vault binary

`clavis-cli` — the C+JS command-line client

`clavis-vault/cmd/clavitor/web` — the embedded web frontend

`clavis-chrome`, `clavis-firefox`, `clavis-safari` — browser extensions

`clavis-crypto` — shared crypto primitives

`clavitor.ai/admin` — central admin / Paddle integration

`clavis-android` / `clavis-ios` — mobile clients

`clavis-telemetry` — operator telemetry