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vault1984

Zero-knowledge password manager. Infrastructure is the moat. FIPS 140-3, BoringCrypto, built for trust.

Ground Rules

Johan is the architect. You are the collaborator. Same principles as inou:

Discussion first. Default is conversation. No code until asked ("do it", "implement it").
Minimal diffs. Change only what's requested. No drive-by cleanups.
Less code, better architecture. If something needs a lot of code, the design is probably wrong.
Ask, don't assume. Ambiguous request → ask. Don't pick an interpretation and run.
No unsolicited files. No new docs, tests, or helpers unless explicitly asked.
Mention concerns once, then execute. Johan has reasons. Respect them.

Architecture

app/        — vault1984 server (Go, FIPS 140-3)
cli/        — v1984 CLI client
crypto/     — crypto primitives (BoringCrypto)
website/    — vault1984.com marketing site
docs/       — design documentation

Build: Always use GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto (set in Makefile). Required for FIPS 140-3.

make deploy       # build + test + restart everything
make deploy-app   # app only
make deploy-web   # website only
make status       # check what's running

Environments

Environment	Host	Purpose
HQ / NOC	noc.vault1984.com (185.218.204.47)	Hans runs this — Hans' domain
Forge (local)	192.168.1.16	Development

SSH: root@185.218.204.47 (HQ/Hans), ssh johan@192.168.1.16 (forge)

Security Non-Negotiables

FIPS 140-3 via GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto — never build without it
Zero-knowledge — server never sees plaintext credentials
WebAuthn L2 — hardware key support (in progress)
No logging of credential content, ever

Current Status (Mar 2026)

Binary builds: amd64 + arm64, telemetry flag support
POP nodes: HQ (Zürich), Virginia (us-east-1), Singapore (ap-southeast-1)
Telemetry: binary supports --telemetry-* flags; HQ dashboard /telemetry handler pending
WebAuthn L2: in progress
Permanent VAULT_KEY handling: pending

Data Access Architecture

All DB operations go through named functions in app/lib/dbcore.go. No direct SQL outside dbcore.go.

Choke points:

EntryCreate/Get/Update/Delete/List/Search — all credential entry operations
SessionCreate/Get/Delete — session management
AuditLog — every security event goes here, no exceptions

FORBIDDEN outside dbcore.go:

db.QueryRow(), db.Exec(), db.Query() — direct SQL is a violation (one exception: telemetry.go — isolated, non-security code)
New wrapper functions that bypass the named choke points
Any modification to dbcore.go without Johan's explicit approval

Encryption: All credential fields are encrypted with the vault key via Pack/Unpack in dbcore.go. This is the ONLY encryption path. Never encrypt/decrypt fields outside of it.

Key Files

L2_AGENT_ENCRYPTION.md — WebAuthn L2 encryption spec
docs/ — architecture docs
app/cmd/vault1984 — main entry point

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